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ABSTRACT
Racial minorities are increasingly growing in the United States and the racial
category “multiracial” is one of the fastest growing racial minorities. Racial
essentialism is the belief that race has an underlying property and is innate
and biological. Many people with essentialist beliefs do not normally
categorize individuals with a multiracial background as multiracial. The current
study assessed how an essentialism manipulation affects the neural
processing of minority race targets by White participants. Participants
completed a categorization task and passive task looking at ambiguous and
monoracial faces while connect to EEG. For the passive task, results revealed
gradient by race by condition interactions for the N170, P2, and N4
components as well as race by gradient interactions for the P1, N2, P3, N3,
and LPP components. Additionally, the category chosen for the target affected
neural processing in the N3 component for the categorization condition. These
findings demonstrate the need for continued research of the perception of
multiracial individuals and continued attempts to reduce attentional bias.
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Effects of an Essentialism Manipulation on the Neural Processing of Racial
Minorities
The U.S. Census Bureau (2014) predicts that more than half of Americans
will belong to a minority group by 2044 and that nearly one in five people in the
entire U.S. population is projected to be foreign born by that year (Colby &
Jennifer, 2014). The number of people who consider themselves as multiracial
has also grown (Gathier, 2015) and has become one of the fastest growing U.S.
population segments, increasing 32% in the last decade to about 9 million
Americans (Humes, Jones, & Ramirez, 2011). With the growing population of
racial minorities and mixed race individuals, it might seem that negative attitudes
toward racial minorities will decrease in the coming years as different social
groups interact more with one another. However, studies have suggested that
the changing U.S. racial population can trigger “greater pro-White/anti-Black”
minority sentiment in White individuals (Craig & Richeson, 2014, pg. 754; Outten,
Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). The population shift may be seen as a threat to
majority White status and is coupled with a resistance towards that shift,
increasing politically conservative viewpoints including changes in racial policies
such as immigration (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Overall, these studies suggest
that prejudice may be increasing among Whites with growing numbers of
minorities (Craig & Richeson, 2014). As minorities continue to populate the U.S.,
studying the perceptions of racial minority and multiracial individuals is critical to
reduce prejudice and improve relations among groups.
Person Perception and Social Categorization
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Social categorization is the process by which people are identified as
members of a social group (e.g., race, sexual orientation) rather than seen as
individuals (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Social categorization is
thought to occur as a result of the complexity of the social world, as an attempt to
simplify perception to conserve cognitive resources (Lippman, 1922). Since
Lippman’s conceptualization of social categorization, studies have supported this
explanation through demonstrating that social categorization is an energy-saving
device that simplifies information processing (Allport, 1954; Anderson, Klatzky, &
Murray, 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Fiske & Neurberg, 1990;
Tajfel, 1969) due to individuation being a time-consuming and cognitivelydraining exercise (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak,
1986). Social categorization has been demonstrated to occur with many social
groups (e.g., gender, age, race, and sexual orientation) but tends to happen
more easily and more often in social groups that are easily visually identifiable,
such as racial groups that are socially constructed in our society (Balcetis &
Lassiter, 2010; Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002). Research shows that
racial categorizations often occur within a few hundred milliseconds of viewing a
face (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, García, & Bargh, 1999; Ito &
Urland, 2003, 2005), suggesting that this is an implicit cognitive process.
Because targets belong to multiple social categories (i.e., race, gender,
age; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Neumann & DeSchepper, 1992; Tipper, 1985),
the “category salience, chronic accessibility, and goal relevance” determine
which social category perceivers attribute to the target (Bodenhausen & Macrae,
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1998, pg. 98). Gender and race tend to be the most salient social categories
because they represent “fundamental divides of the natural world” which are
believed by people to be biological and stable foundations (Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000, pg. 21). Once a social category is salient, learned
expectancies are activated and can lead perceivers to make stereotype-based
judgments of the target (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). Activation of stereotypes depends on factors such as
perceiver’s temporary processing goals (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Macrae et al.,
1997; Spencer et al., 1998), their general prejudice levels toward members of the
category (e.g., Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), and perceiver’s
chronic beliefs about out group members (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke et al.,
1994; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), among many others (see Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000 for a review). Social categorization can therefore lead to
stereotype activation about a social group which can lead quicker categorization
of outgroup members (e.g., Levin, 1996; Kubota & Ito, 2007), implicit activation of
stereotypes and negative appraisals of outgroup members (e.g. Fazio, Jackson,
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink et al., 2001), poorer memory for outgroup
members (e.g., Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Levin, 2000), and negative perceptions
of group members (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Additional
consequences of this categorical thinking include discriminatory behavior,
especially toward outgroups (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Correll, Park, Judd,
& Wittenbrink, 2002; Jussim, Palumbo, Smith, & Madon, 2000; Payne, 2001).
For instance, when White participants were primed with stereotypes about
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Blacks, they tended to show more hostility toward experimenter requests than
White participants who were not primed with those stereotypes (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996). Similarly, Correll and colleagues (2002) found that White
participants playing a video game where they were told to shoot armed targets
and to not shoot unarmed targets were quicker to shoot armed targets if the
target was Black and were quicker to decide against shooting an un-armed target
if the target was White. This bias was also shown among Black participants.
These studies suggest that stereotype activation can lead to behaviors that can
lead to potential harm. More research is needed to mitigate the activation of
stereotypes and the resulting behaviors.
Ambiguity and Categorization
Although much research has examined the social categorization of
monoracial targets, there is less research on the social categorization of
multiracial targets (Freeman, Pauker, Apfelbaum, & Ambady, 2010). Being
multiracial refers to having multiple racial identities (Hamilton & Chen, 2012).
Though the category of multiracial individuals is growing, many people who have
a background including more than one race still tend to identify as monoracial
(Pew, 2015). For example, Halle Berry was the first Black woman to win an
Academy Award for Best Actress and identifies as Black though her ancestry
would make her multiracial (she has a White mother and Black father; Hamilton &
Chen, 2012). However, race is a continuum where most individuals are
multiracial (Bodenhausen, 2010; Chakravarti, 2009). Multiracial individuals are
often referred to as “ambiguous” to perceivers because they do not “fit” into
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predefined racial categories and are often difficult to categorize by these
perceivers (Chen & Hamilton, 2012). In this paper, the multiracial label will be
used most often to refer to groups of people who identify as multiracial or have
multiracial backgrounds. In contrast, the ambiguous label will be used when
talking about studies conducted using faces because much of the time,
“ambiguous” faces are digitally “morphed” from two parent faces (e.g., Black and
White parents) using software rather than being naturally multiracial.
One common theory to explain how people categorize multiracial
individuals (especially Black-White multiracial) is hypodescent or a categorization
system where anyone who has mixed racial ancestry is classified as the “socially
subordinate race” (Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen,
2008). The most common application of this in the US is the “one-drop rule” in
which historically people tend to categorize anybody with “one drop” of “Black
blood” as Black. This “one-drop rule” came about in the US as part of institutional
racism, even after slavery had ended. That is, categorizing anyone with a Black
ancestor as Black denied that person the rights of White individuals and allowed
for individuals to be subjected to the severe legal and social discrimination that
their ancestors went through (Ho et al., 2011). This is coupled with the underlying
historic assumption that Black individuals are subordinate to White individuals
(Lewis, 2016). Many studies have found support for this theory (e.g., Ho et al.,
2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) where White participants will often classify
multiracial faces as Black. Peery and Bodenhausen (2008) and Ho and
colleagues (2011) used similar paradigms whereby White participants were
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shown ambiguous target faces that were accompanied by profiles that either
labeled one or two grandparents as White (Ho et al., 2011) or profiles about the
target’s parents race (Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008). Both sets of researchers
had participants complete a speeded categorization task after viewing the target
images and profiles where they were asked to categorize the target as either
White/non-White and Black/non-Black (Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) or as
White, Black, or mixed race (Ho et al., 2011). Both sets of researchers found that
participants were quicker and more likely to categorize the multiracial faces as
Black, especially if they were said to have any amount of Black ancestry.
Another popular theory attempting to explain these findings is the in-group
overexclusion effect which predicts the same results for White participants as
hypodescent does. This theory states that people are motivated to protect their
in-group from outside members and thus exclude multiracial targets from their ingroup (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). In support of this theory, Castano and
colleagues (2002) showed that people who identified more strongly with their
ingroup were more likely than those who identified more weakly to show the
overexclusion effect. These theories both suggest that the categorization of
multiracial individuals is rooted in institutional racism in our society.
Multiple studies have suggested that external contextual factors can
influence the categorization of racially ambiguous individuals (Ito et al., 2011;
Lewis, 2016; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2008). Lewis (2016) found that the
perceiver’s racial experiences mattered when categorizing mixed-race targets
such that perceivers with greater experience with White faces categorized mixed-
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race faces as Black more often than White while perceivers with greater
experience with Black faces categorized mixed-race faces as White more often
than Black. This suggests that the perceivers’ familiarity with racial categories
influence categorization of target faces and also that racial categorization is an
individual attribute.
Another factor that has been shown to influence the social categorization
of multiracial individuals in this research is the racial labels provided to
participants. Most research has focused on categorizing multiracial individuals as
either Black/non-Black or White/non-White (e.g., Lewis, 2016; Peery &
Bodenhausen, 2008) or has had participants choose between either a Black or
White categorization (e.g., Krosch & Amodio, 2014; Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord,
2012). In most of these studies, “Black” categories are used much more often to
classify racially ambiguous target faces than are other categories. However,
when participants are asked to verbally assign a category to a multiracial target,
multiracial labels are barely used at all and often “other” races such as Hispanic
and Middle Eastern serve to categorize ambiguous images (Nicolas, Skinner, &
Dickter, under review). The results of the article by Nicolas, Skinner, and Dickter
suggest that White individuals prefer categorizing multiracial targets using
discrete racial categories (i.e., putting targets into already made categories)
instead of viewing race as a continuum (but see Chen & Hamilton, 2012).
Context can also play a role in categorization (e.g., Ito et al., 2011;
Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2008). For instance, Ito and colleagues (2011) found that
racially-ambiguous faces were perceived as more prototypically Black and less
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prototypically White when presented with only ambiguous and White faces but
that the opposite was true when presented with only ambiguous and Black faces.
Similarly, Willadsen-Jensen and Ito (2008) found that Asian perceivers neurally
processed Asian and racially ambiguous faces more deeply when shown many
Asian faces but processed White and racially ambiguous faces more deeply
when showed many White faces. Taken together, this research demonstrates
that context appears to be a factor in how perceivers categorize multiracial
individuals, along with familiarity and known racial categories. Therefore,
categorizing multiracial target faces is more complex and possibly based more
on the perceiver than categorization of monoracial target faces.
Person Perception and Attention
One of the cognitive processes associated with racial categorization is
implicit attention. Research has shown that level of implicit attention allocated to
a particular target is associated with social categorization as well as how targets
are perceived (e.g., Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997;
Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012). Some researchers have
found that perceivers demonstrate differential attention to outgroup relative to
ingroup members using implicit behavioral tasks such as the Dot Probe task
(Brosch & Van Bavel, 2012; Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008), whereas
others have not found a difference in attention between these groups (Dickter,
Gagnon, Gyurovski, & Brewington, 2015; Donders, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2008).
During the Dot Probe task, participants are shown a fixation cross in the middle
of the screen and then a picture on either side that are part of the social group in
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which the researchers are interested. For example, in studies that use Black and
White target faces, one side of the screen will have a picture of a Black target
face while the other side will have a picture of a White target face. The faces are
replaced by a dot on one side of the screen and participants are instructed to
press a button corresponding to the side of the screen the dot was shown. This
task is thought to measure implicit attention by measuring participants’ reaction
times with the idea that it will take longer to press the button if the dot appears
behind the picture that participants’ attention is not on.
Reaction time based measures such as the Dot Probe are limited when
investigating the cognitive processing of social groups as they are dependent on
the speed of motor processes and task requirements (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000) and
may be affected by cognitive control processes such as social presentation
(Sternberg, 2010). Therefore, recent studies have turned toward using
psychophysiological measures which can show us the underlying neural events
that are occurring during the social categorization process. Event-related brain
potentials (ERPs) have a high temporal resolution so they provide an ideal
measure of implicit attention during social categorization. Unlike reaction time
based measures, ERPs are also independent of cognitive control processes and
thus participants cannot control these implicit responses (Ito, Thompson, &
Cacioppo, 2004). ERPs are epochs from EEG that are time-locked to repeated
stimulus presentation (Bartholow & Dickter, 2011) and are the result of a specific
cognitive, sensory, or motor event (Luck, 2012). There are multiple ERP
components that each represent different cognitive processes, including implicit
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attention.
The P1 component is a positive component that typically peaks around
100 ms and is usually the first component elicited by visual stimuli (Luck, 2005).
It has been assumed to reflect early visual processing and may be moderated by
attention (Luck, 2005; Wiese et al., 2009). Due to its connection with visual
stimuli and attention, the P1 component is a component of interest to examine
implicit processing during racial categorization.
The N170 component is one that is particularly sensitive to faces (e.g.,
Eimer, 2000; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chen, 1997) and is a negative
component that peaks around 170 ms. It has also been suggested as playing a
role in the identification of social category information in faces (Freeman,
Ambady, & Holcomb, 2010). This component is of theoretical interest because it
has been associated with the differential processing of own-race and other-race
faces and is usually found to be larger to ingroup faces (Caldara et al., 2003;
Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito & Urland, 2005; Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre,
2008; Wiese et al., 2009).
The P2 component is positive and usually peaks around 200 ms poststimulus. A larger P2 amplitude is thought to reflect greater attention to a
stimulus (Hillyard & Munte, 1984; Luck & Hillyard, 1994; Ritter, Simson, &
Vaughan, 1983; Wijers, Mulder, Okita, Mulder, & Scheffers, 1989). One of the
most consistent findings in ERP research with faces is that the P2 component is
larger to racial outgroup than ingroup faces (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito &
Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008).
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The N2 component is a negative component that peaks around 200-400
ms after the stimulus and is sensitive to social group membership (Luck, 2005).
Another of the most consistent findings in ERP research looking at target faces is
that the N2 is larger to racial ingroup than outgroup faces (e.g., Dickter &
Bartholow, 2007; Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005;
Kubota & Ito, 2007; Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008; Willadsen-Jensen
& Ito, 2006, 2008).
The P3 component typically peaks around 250-500ms and is typically
associated with novelty (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) where the
amplitude usually increases when the likelihood of the event decreases (e.g.,
Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires et al., 1975).
Studies have also found that people have better memory for stimuli which elicit
larger amplitudes (e.g., Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Friedman &
Johnson, 2000). In previous studies, this component has been shown to be due
to the novelty of faces based on race.
Finally, the LPP component usually is usually initiated around 400 ms and
is larger following the presentation of racial ingroup than outgroup faces (Ito &
Urland, 2003; Wiese et al., 2009).
Taken together, ERP research examining the categorization of social
groups has demonstrated that early attention is directed differentially to in-group
and out-group members though much of this research has focused on attention
to monoracial targets (e.g., Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Dickter & Bartholow,
2007; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Ito et al., 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005), most
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consistently demonstrating that the P2 and N2 components differentiate between
Black and White faces (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006,
2008; Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Kubota & Ito, 2007).
Essentialist Thinking
Studies have suggested that many different factors influence racial
categorization, ranging from group identification (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt,
Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), stereotypes and affective orientations (e.g., Richeson
& Trawalter, 2005), prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004),
political ideologies and affiliations (e.g., Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009), as well
as beliefs about the underlying nature of race (Eberhardt, Dasgupta, &
Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks et al., 2012). Beliefs about the nature of race are
particularly interesting because they can be manipulated more easily than
stereotypes or political ideologies can. Also, research has consistently shown
that people tend to allocate more attention and resources to people they perceive
as kin (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Kruger, 2003; O’Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2005), so
people who believe that race is biological in nature may be less likely to direct
attention/resources to outgroup members (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).
Most researchers will argue that race is socially constructed and research
has supported this view. For example, Zuckerman (1990) found that there are
many more genetic differences within traditionally defined racial groups than
between them. In addition, a study found that unemployed, incarcerated or
impoverished people were more likely to both be categorized as black and selfidentify as black, without regard to how they were categorized previously,
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suggesting race as malleable instead of fixed (Penner & Saperstein, 2008).
These researchers also found that race can change over time according to
perceivers and individuals as well as change in response to social position
(Saperstein & Penner, 2012). Additionally, cues regarding status can affect the
racial category to which individuals are assigned (Freeman, Penner, Saperstein,
Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011; Penner & Saperstein, 2008). When people are told
that a woman receives welfare payments, they are more likely to categorize her
as Black rather than White (Penner & Saperstein, 2013).
Though many researchers argue that race is a socially constructed
category, many people often treat this category as naturally existing (Markus,
2008). People often assume that race is set in stone, immutable, and biologically
based with attributed meaning to the categorization based on the outward visual
characteristic of different racial groups (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). This is the
basis of essentialist thinking. Gaither and colleagues (2014, pg. 2) state that
racial essentialism is composed of many components including social, cultural,
and cognitive that “impact perception, mental representation, and judgement”.
This thinking seems to be grounded in the belief that the categories have
underlying essences that define their nature (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony,
1989).
Psychological essentialism is the belief that members of a group share
“essences” that grant them their categorical identity (Gelman, 2003; Haslam,
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007). These categories are seen as
discrete because traditionally a person can either have an “essence” or not
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(Dennett & Mittwoch, 1995). Race is one of the most essentialized social groups
because there is a highly visual component that people can hone in on, believing
that we can easily categorize a person based on their race (Haslam et al., 2000;
Prentice & Miller, 2007). Essentialism therefore promotes racial categories as
objective and natural and exaggerates differences between groups while downplaying differences within groups (e.g., Freeman et al., 2010; Maddox & Gray,
2002). However, there are many variations and ambiguities within race that are
not accounted for by essentializing groups (Gaither et al., 2014). Psychological
essentialism affects how people observe categories and members within that
category and can affect how likely people are to bridge category divides (Prentice
& Miller, 2007).
Essentialist Thinking and Ambiguity. Essentialist thinking will be
especially important when a member of a group is not easily categorized into preexisting groups, such as ambiguous or mixed-race individuals (Pauker, Rule, &
Ambady, 2010). Indeed, people are slower to make categorization decisions
when the target person cannot be easily identified by race, creating uncertainty
(see Chen & Hamilton, 2012). Additionally, priming essentialist beliefs makes
people less likely to use a multiracial categorization for ambiguous-raced
individuals (Chen & Hamilton, 2012).
Additionally, people who endorse racial essentialism are more likely to
endorse hypodescent and are more likely to categorize ambiguous-raced
individuals as belonging to the subordinate social group (Chao, Hong, & Chiu,
2013). Essentialist thinking also predicts reliance on monoracial and discrete
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labels when processing and trying to remember racially ambiguous faces
(Eberhardt et al., 2003; Pauker & Ambady, 2009). Finally, biracial adults are less
likely to endorse essentialist thinking than their monoracial counterparts (Bonam
& Shih, 2009; Pauker & Ambady, 2009; Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, & Peck 2007).
Consequences of Essentialist Thinking. People who hold essentialist
conceptions of race are more likely to endorse racial stereotypes (Bastian &
Haslam, 2006; Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam, Bastian,
Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; Plaks, Stroessner,
Dweck, & Sherman, 2001; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001), misremember
minority group members in stereotypical ways (Eberhardt et al., 2003), act in
prejudicial ways (Condit, Parrott, Bates, Bevan, & Achter, 2004; Jayaratne et al.,
2006; Keller, 2005) and show less concern for, and interest in, interacting with
racial outgroup members (Keller, 2005; Verkuyten, 2003; Williams & Eberhardt,
2008). Similarly, Williams and Eberhardt (2008) found that individuals who
endorsed a biological conception of race were more likely to endorse African
American stereotypes than were individuals who endorse a social conception of
race. Leyens and colleagues (2000, 2003) also found that essentialist beliefs
were associated with a propensity to view outgroups as less likely to experience
uniquely human emotions and therefore as not completely human.
There are various ways to reduce racial essentialism in White individuals.
Young, Sanchez, and Wilton (2013) found that labeling racially ambiguous
images as biracial led a reduction of essentialist beliefs in individuals while
labeling racially ambiguous images as monoracial led to an increase of
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essentialist beliefs. A series of studies conducted by Sanchez, Young, and
Pauker (2015) showed that being exposed to racial ambiguity and interacting
with a racially ambiguous individual led to a reduction in biological lay theories.
This effect lasted for two weeks. Williams and Eberhardt (2008) also conducted a
series of studies where participants were primed via a news article of a biological
or social-constructivist view of race. When primed with a biological view of race,
participants were more likely to accept racial injustices and less likely to want to
interact with an outgroup member.
Current Research
Taken together, previous research suggests that holding essentialist
beliefs about race can lead to paying greater attention to minority members and
being faster in categorizing minority targets which may in turn lead to later
prejudicial behavior. The current research was conducted to examine whether
manipulating essentialist beliefs influences the neural processing of multiracial
and monoracial minorities. This study expands on the current literature where
essentialism has been manipulated only in behavioral studies (e.g., Williams &
Eberhardt, 2008; Ho et al., 2015) and where researchers have mostly looked at
monoracial faces following an essentialism manipulation (e.g., Williams &
Eberhardt, 2008). Examining the implicit processing of multiracial faces at the
neural level will aid in our understanding of the timecourse of the cognitive
processes resulting from viewing multiracial individuals, which could have
implications for social categorization and stereotype activation. In addition,
examining ways to change this processing can help us further understand the
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contextual factors influencing these cognitive processes which is especially
important as the multiracial population in the US grows.
In this study, participants were given an essentialism manipulation where
they read an article that claimed that race is either biological or social in nature,
or were given an article that had nothing to do with race (i.e., control). After
reading the article, participants completed a task where they viewed White/Black
monoracial and multiracial faces and categorized the faces as “Black”, “White”,
“Mixed Race”, or “Other Race” and also completed a passive viewing task where
no response was necessary.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The essentialism manipulation will influence people’s
previously held essentialist beliefs. People who read an article suggesting that
race is socially constructed will have decreased post-test essentialism scores
whereas people who read an article suggesting that race is biologically
constructed will have increased post-test essentialist beliefs scores and people
who read the control article will not change in their essentialist beliefs. However,
we expect that the people whose scores will change the most are those in the
middle-low to middle-high range in essentialism scores as people who are
extremely high or low many not be influenced by reading one article in a lab
setting. We expect that participant race will not play a role here.
Hypothesis 2: Participants will be quicker to categorize monoracial
versus multiracial faces. Participants will categorize monoracial target faces
more quickly relative to morphed, multiracial faces (e.g., Levin, 2000; Peery &
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Bodenhausen, 2008; Stroessner, 1996). Non-White participants will show similar
effects.
Hypothesis 3: White participants will have differential neural
attention for outgroup and ambiguous targets compared to White targets.
Larger ERP amplitudes are associated with greater neural attention so we expect
to replicate previous literature in which participants will have greater amplitudes
toward racial minority targets than White targets. We will investigate the P1,
N170, P2, N2, P3, and LPP components. We expect the positive components
(i.e., P1, P2, P3, LPP) to show greater attention toward outgroup rather than
ingroup faces. For White participants, that means that participants will have
higher amplitudes toward Black/ambiguous faces than White faces whereas nonWhite participants will have similar amplitudes across target race. We expect the
negative components (i.e., N170 and N2) to show greater attention toward
ingroup rather than outgroup faces. For White participants then we expect higher
amplitudes in the negative components to White target faces as opposed to
Black/ambiguous target faces because previous research has demonstrated this
effect (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007;
Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008). Again, we expect non-White participants to
have similar amplitudes across target race. We expect the negative components
(i.e., N170 and N2) to have greater amplitudes toward ingroup rather than
outgroup faces. For White participants, we expect higher amplitudes in the
negative components to White target faces as opposed to Black/ambiguous
target faces. Again, we expect non-White participants to have similar amplitudes
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across target race.
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the social constructivist condition will
have less neural attention for Black and ambiguous targets compared to
participants in the biological condition while the control condition will be
somewhere between. Participants who read an article stating that race is
socially constructed will have ERP amplitudes that are not significantly different
between Black, ambiguous, or White targets while participants who read that
race is biological will have more extreme ERP amplitudes toward Black and
ambiguous targets compared to the White targets. We expect this to occur in the
positive components.
Hypothesis 5: Participants who use more mixed race labels for faces
will have less neural attention for Black and ambiguous targets. Participants
who are more likely to use the “mixed” race label for faces will have lower
amplitudes toward racial minorities (both monoracial and ambiguous) than will
their counterparts who choose mostly monoracial or “other” race for target faces.
Method
Participants
Participants were 74 undergraduates (55% female) who were enrolled in
an Introductory Psychology course at a medium-sized public liberal arts college.
All the participants were between 18 and 22 years of age, with a mean age of
19.14 (SD = 1.02) years. Participants were 66% White, 7% Black, 18%
Asian/Pacific Islander, 5% Native American, 16% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other.
All participants were right-handed and reported no previous head trauma. All
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procedures were approved by the college’s Protection of Human Subjects
Committee, and written informed and debriefing consent was obtained from each
participant. Participants received partial course credit for participating.
Materials
Picture stimuli. Pictures were taken from the NimStim database
(Tottenham et al., 2009) which included pictures of various races and has been
used previously in ERP studies (e.g., He, Johnson, Dovidio, & McCarthy, 2009;
Smith, Weinberg, Moran, & Hajcak, 2013). The pictures that we included were
Black and White parent faces which were morphed using Morpheus to create
intermediate categories of 25%, 50%, and 75% Black, see Appendix A. The
pictures were shown in color in order to increase external validity (Stepanova &
Strube, 2009). All pictures were cropped so that just their face was showing. We
included only 5 levels of Black-to-White phenotypicality: 0% Black/100% White,
25% Black/75% White, 50% Black/50% White, 75% Black/25% White, and 100%
Black/0% White. These faces were piloted and matched on attractiveness. Four
pictures were chosen from each of the five categories of phenotypicality for both
males and females, creating ten categories, five from each gender. These photos
were piloted then tested using a 5 x 2 x 4 (Phenotypicality x Sex x Individual
Target) ANOVA for attractiveness which revealed no main effects or interactions,
all ps > .100.
Picture viewing tasks. Participants completed the following tasks while
connected to the computer via an amplifier to record EEG.
Passive task. Participants completed a passive picture-viewing task
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designed to assess implicit levels of attention toward racial minorities.
Participants were told that no response was necessary and that they were to just
watch the pictures carefully as they would be tested on them later. Pictures were
each shown for 1000 ms and the ITI ranged from between 1000 ms to 2000 ms.
Categorization task. Participants also completed a categorization task in
which they were asked to classify the images into one of four categories: Black,
White, mixed race, or other. These categories were counterbalanced across
participants. Participants first completed a practice trial consisting of 5 images
before completing the actual trial. Participants used their right hand on the
number keys 1, 3, 5, and 7 to categorize the faces. On the computer screen,
participants were told to categorize the faces as “White”, “Black”, “Mixed Race”,
or “Other Race” but labels above the numbers on the keyboard were labeled
“White”, “Black”, “Mixed”, “Other”. Target faces were each presented until
participants pressed a button or no longer than 2000 ms and the ITI between
pictures ranged from between 1000 ms to 2000 ms.
Questionnaires. In addition to completing a demographic questionnaire in
which participants indicated their age, gender, race/ethnicity, and what year in
college they are currently in, they also completed the following questionnaires to
assess explicit attitudes toward racial groups as well as their familiarity with racial
minorities.
Race conceptions scale (RCS; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). The RCS
was used to assess racial essentialism or a physical conception of race, see
Appendix B. This scale consists of 10 items. Participants reported the degree to
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which they agreed with statements such as “I believe physical features determine
race” and “The same racial categories have pretty much always existed” using a
7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale has
been shown to have adequate internal consistency (α = .79-.93). Responses
were reverse-coded where necessary and averaged, with higher scores
indicating a more physical conception of race.
Attitudes toward Blacks measure (ATB; Brigham, 1993). The ATB was
used to assess attitudes toward Black individuals and consists of 20 items, see
Appendix C. Participants rated their level of agreement for items such as “Some
Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them” and
“Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The appropriate items were reversecoded and individual items were averaged to form a composite score with higher
scores indicating a more positive attitude toward Blacks.
Familiarity with racial minorities. To assess close contact with racial
minority group members, participants provided the initials of up to 20 close
friends and then subsequently identified the race of those individuals. This
measure was previously used to covertly identify close friendships with
individuals of different social groups (Dickter et al., 2015; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998).
Essentialism Manipulation. Participants were assigned one of three
articles to read taken from Williams and Eberhardt (2008), see Appendix D. One
third of the participants read an article meant to prime a biological view of race
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entitled “Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race” where a quote said
that it is possible to “correctly guess the patients’ racial backgrounds 69% of the
time, which is well above chance rate” from a melanin gene. Another third of the
participants read an article meant to prime a social-constructivist view of race
entitled “Scientists Reveal That Race Has No Genetic Basis” where a quote
indicates that it is possible to “correctly guess the patients’ racial backgrounds
only 27% of the time, which is really no better than chance” from a melanin gene.
Finally, the rest of the participants read a control article that was not related to
race entitled “Scientists Discover Galaxy With Gas Halo” which was comparable
in difficulty and readability to the experimental articles (Williams & Eberhardt,
2008).
Procedure
The experiment was completed in three parts. In the first part, all students
who were enrolled in an Introduction to Psychology course completed the RCS in
a mass testing questionnaire that included questions from all different areas of
psychology. Participants were then recruited based on their scores (most with
mid-range to high scores on the RCS) to participate in the next parts of the study.
We recruited these participants because we were trying to reduce essentialist
beliefs and felt that these participants would be most likely to believe in the
manipulation, thereby changing their views. Participants who were recruited had
mean scores ranging from 3.82 to 6.32 (M = 4.36; SD = 0.48) and were sent an
email inviting them to participate in the next two parts of the study.
Participants completed the second part of the study online on their own
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time, completing the RCS, the ATB scale, and some demographic questions,
along with the following filler questionnaires that will not be analyzed in the
current study: Current Mood Assessment (Sechrist, Swim, & Mark, 2003) and the
Big Five Personality Trait Short Questionnaire (Morizot, 2014). The mood and
personality questionnaires were included so that all questions being asked were
not about race and therefore the purpose of the study was not as obvious. These
RCS scores were used as a pre-test measure of essentialism, before they
completed the manipulation.
For the main study, the third part, testing was conducted with one
participant at a time. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants completed an
informed consent form and the EEG procedure was explained. The electrode cap
was then placed on the participant’s head and electrodes were tested to assure
low impedances. Participants sat 70 cm from the computer screen and were
instructed to stay as still as possible during the trials in order to reduce noise in
the EEG data.
Participants were given the essentialism article to read and told that
because they would be tested later, they should read through it carefully.
Participants let the experimenter know when they had finished reading then
followed the instructions presented on the computer screen. Participants then
completed the experimental blocks while the EEG data were recorded and the
article was given again in between the two tasks. All tasks were counterbalanced
across participants. In each of the tasks, participants completed a total of 400
trials (4 from each of the 10 categories that were each presented 10 times).
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Participants then completed the experimental blocks while the EEG data were
recorded and the article was given again in between the two tasks. After
completing all tasks, the electrode cap was removed and participants completed
the self-report measures on the computer, including the RCS again which was
used as post-test essentialism scores. When participants were finished with the
online questionnaire they were debriefed and signed a debriefing form.
Participants were then thanked and dismissed.
Electrophysiological Recording and Analysis
EEG data were recorded using BrainVision Recorder software
(BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). The EEG data were recorded from 32 AgAgCl sintered electrodes in an electrode cap, placed using the expanded
International 10-20 electrode placement system. All electrodes were referenced
to an electrode placed in the middle of the head, and the ground electrode was
placed in the middle of the forehead. Eye movement and blinking were recorded
from electrodes placed on the lateral canthi and peri-occular electrodes on the
superior and inferior orbits, aligned with the pupils. Before data collection was
initiated, all impedances were adjusted to within 0-20 kΩ.
Following data collection, the EEG data were analyzed using BrainVision
Analyzer software (BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). Eye movement artifacts in
the data were corrected, using either ocular correction or ocular ICA correction
based on how noisy the continuous data were (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983).
All EEG data were filtered at low pass .01 Hz and at high pass 30 Hz.
Segmentation 200 ms prior to stimulus onset and 1000 ms post-stimulus onset
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was performed. After baseline correction over the pre-stimulus interval,
segmented data were averaged for each participant in each of the conditions.
Analysis Strategy
For our analyses we first conducted a 2 (Time: Pre-Test, Post-Test) x 3
(Condition: Social, Biological, Control) x 2 (Race: White, Non-White) mixed
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test our first hypothesis that the
essentialism manipulation influenced people’s previously held essentialist beliefs.
We included race as a between subjects’ factor because White participants
would be viewing ingroup faces while non-White participants who are not Black
would not be looking at any ingroup faces and previous research has found a
difference in the way people process outgroup versus ingroup faces (Lewis,
2016).
Next, a 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black,
50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) mixed
measures ANOVA was performed on the reaction times and ERP amplitudes of
the participants separately for the passive viewing task and the categorization
task, testing hypotheses three and four. The analyses conducted for the ERP
components of interest were conducted at electrode clusters that were chosen
based on previous research of the electrodes each component measures. P1,
P2, P3, LPP, N170, and N2 were chosen because of theoretical interest and
because they were identified using the BrainVision Analyzer software
(BrainVision LLC, Morrisville, NC). N3 and N4 were chosen because they were
clearly identified as components using the software based on how prominent
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these components were for participants. We identified P1 at electrode cluster Pz,
P3, and P4 between 75 ms and 150 ms. N170 was identified between 120 ms
and 200 ms and at electrode cluster T8, TP10, and P8. P2 was identified at
electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 175 ms and 250 ms. N2 was identified
at electrode cluster Fz, F3, and F4 between 175 ms and 220 ms. N3 was
identified between 250 ms and 320 ms at electrode cluster Cz, C3, and C4. P3
was identified at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 250 ms and 350 ms.
N4 was identified between 340 ms and 420 ms at electrode cluster O1, O2, and
Pz. LPP was identified at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4 between 350 ms and
800 ms.
Finally, we report multiple behavioral results. Only significant or marginally
significant results are reported except in the case of essentialist beliefs (our
manipulation check) and ERP components.
Results
Participant Characteristics
Of the 74 participants, one was excluded from analyses due to an EEG
malfunction, two were excluded because they had heard about the study from
others who had participated, one was excluded because they correctly guessed
the purpose of the study, three were excluded because they did not believe the
article, two were excluded for having a reaction time that was below 3 SD from
the mean (n = 1) or above 3 SD from the mean (n = 1), and 12 additional
participants were excluded who indicated that they were either Black or
multiracial. The remaining 53 participants (28 males) were between the ages of

28

18 and 22 years old (M = 19.2, SE = .15), and 67.9% reported their race as
White, 17.0% Asian, 11.3% Hispanic, 1.9% Native American, and 1.9% Other.
There were 14 participants in the biological condition (9 White, 5 non-White), 18
in the social condition (11 White, 7 non-White), and 21 in the control condition
(16 White, 5 non-White). As demonstrated in Table 1, these groups did not differ
in age, gender, race, percentage of Black friends, essentialism scores, or
attitudes toward Blacks scores before the study.
Manipulation Check – Hypothesis 1
There was a marginally significant three way interaction, F(2,39) = 2.873,
p = .069, ηp2 = .128, see Figures 1a-1c. For Non-White participants in the social
condition, post-test essentialism scores (M = 4.86, SE = .20) were significantly
higher than were pre-test essentialism scores (M = 3.75, SE = .25), F(1,6) =
22.288, p = .003, ηp2 = .788. All other ps > .185.
Categorization Reaction Time
A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50%
Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Biological, Social, Control)
ANOVA was performed on the reaction times of the participants during the
categorization task. There was a main effect of gradient on participant’s reaction
times, F(4,204) = 51.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .502. This was qualified by a significant
interaction of participant race and target gradient, F(4,204) = 3.54, p = .008, ηp2 =
.065, see Figure 2. Simple main effects revealed a significant main effect of
gradient for White participants, F(4,140) = 48.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .579 and a
significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 18.19, p < .001, ηp2 =
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.532.
Pairwise comparisons for White participants further revealed a significant
difference between reaction times for 0% Black (fully White) target faces
compared to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% Black target faces, all ps < .001, where
White participants were faster in categorizing 0% Black target faces. White
participants were also marginally faster to categorize 25% versus 50% Black
target faces, p = .068, but were significantly slower to categorize 50% target
faces than any other groups, all ps < .001. Non-White participants were also
significantly faster at categorizing 0% Black target faces compared to 25%, 50%,
and 75% Black faces, all ps < .001, but did not significantly differ in reaction time
of 0% and 100% Black target faces. Non-White participants were also
significantly slower to categorize 25% target faces compared to 75% target face,
p = .028, and the 100% Black target faces, p = .011, and were significantly
slower to categorize 50% target faces to 75% or 100% target faces. Finally, nonWhite participants did not significantly differ in reaction times to 75% and 100%
Black target faces.
Psychophysiological Results (Passive Task)
A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50%
Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) mixed
measures ANOVA was conducted for each of the ERP components of interest.
The ERPs used in this section are from the passive task. All of the following
results in this subsection are based on using the 2 x 5 x 3 ANOVA outlined above
but on different ERP components.
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P1. Results indicated a significant interaction between gradient and race
on the amplitude at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 3.10, p = .017,
ηp2 = .062, see Figure 3. For White participants, there was an effect of gradient,
F(4,140) = 3.06, p = .019, ηp2 = .080, but there no effect for Non-White
participants F(4,64) = 1.52, p = .208, ηp2 = .087. Pairwise comparisons with a
Bonferroni correction for White participants further revealed a significant
difference between amplitudes for 0% Black (fully White) target faces (M = 0.76,
SE = 2.08) and 100% Black target faces (M = 3.53, SE = 1.55), p = .048, where
White participants had significantly greater neural attention to 100% Black
compared to 100% White faces. There were no other significant effects on P1
amplitude, all ps > .139.
N170. Results indicated a marginally significant gradient by race
interaction on N170, F(4,188) = 2.51, p = .043, ηp2 = .051, and a significant
gradient by condition interaction, F(8,188) = 2.46, p = .015, ηp2 = .095; both were
qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(8,188) = 1.99, p = .050, ηp2 =
.078, see Figures 4a-4c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black,
25% Black, 50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was
conducted after splitting the file for condition and revealed a significant race by
gradient interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.67, p = .039, ηp2 = .123,
and no significant interactions for either the biological, F(4,48) = 1.59, p = .192,
ηp2 = .117, or social, F(4,64) = 1.51, p = .209, ηp2 = .086, conditions. After
breaking down the control condition by race to look at the effect of gradient on
amplitude there were no main effects of gradient after Bonferroni correction, all
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ps > .296.
P2. Results revealed a gradient by race interaction on P2 amplitude,
F(4,188) = 3.42, p = .010, ηp2 = .068, which was qualified by a marginally
significant three-way interaction, F(8,188) = 1.74, p = .091, ηp2 = .069, see
Figures 5a – 5c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25%
Black, 50% Black, 75% Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was
conducted after splitting the file for condition and revealed a marginally significant
race by gradient interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.40, p = .057, ηp2
= .112, a significant interaction for the biological condition, F(4,48) = 2.66, p =
.044, ηp2 = .181, but no interaction for the social condition. After breaking down
the control and biological conditions by race to look at the effect of gradient on
amplitude there were no main effects of gradient after Bonferroni correction, all
ps > .145.
N2. Results indicated a marginal interaction of gradient and race on N2
amplitude at electrode cluster Fz, F3, and F4, F(4,188) = 2.20, p = .071, ηp2 =
.045, see Figure 6. However, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections
revealed no significant differences between any two gradients, all ps > .636.
N3. Results indicated a marginal main effect of gradient on N3 amplitude
at electrode cluster Cz, C3, and C4, F(4,188) = 2.34, p = .057, ηp2 = .047, see
Figure 7. However, pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences
between any two gradients, all ps > .117. Additionally there was a significant
interaction between gradient and race on N3 amplitude, F(4,188) = 3.10, p =
.017, ηp2 = .062, see Figure 20. A repeated measures ANOVA of gradient split by
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participant race revealed a significant main effect of gradient on amplitude for
White participants, F(4,140) = 2.73, p = .032, ηp2 = .072, and a marginally
significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 2.08, p = .094, ηp2 =
.115. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences after Bonferroni
corrections, all ps > .272.
P3. Results indicated a significant main effect of gradient on P3 amplitude
at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 2.48, p = .046, ηp2 = .050. There
was a gradient by race interaction on P3 amplitude, F(4,188) = 3.04, p = .019, ηp2
= .061, see Figure 8. There was a significant main effect of gradient on amplitude
for White participants, F(4,140) = 3.56, p = .008, ηp2 = .092 but no significant
main effect for Non-White participants, F(4,64) = 1.79, p = .141, ηp2 = .101.
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed only a marginally
significant difference between 0% Black and 25% Black target faces for White
participants, p = .095 where participants had greater neural attention to 25%
Black faces (M = 5.20, SE = 1.49) than to 0% Black faces (M = 1.74, SE = 1.78).
Finally, there was a marginally significant main effect of condition on P3
amplitude, F(2,47) = 2.44, p = .098, ηp2 = .094, see Figure 9. However, no
pairwise comparisons were significant after a Bonferroni correction, all ps > .486.
N4. There was a gradient by race interaction on the N4 amplitude at
electrode cluster O1, O2, and Pz, F(4,188) = 2.69, p = .032, ηp2 = .054, a
marginal gradient by condition interaction on N4, F(8,188) = 1.77, p = .086, ηp2 =
.070, and a marginal race by condition interaction on N4, F(8,188) = 2.88, p =
.066, ηp2 = .109. These effects were all qualified by a significant three-way
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interaction, F(8,188) = 1.98, p = .051, ηp2 = .078, see Figures 10a-10c. A 2
(Race: White, Non-White) x 5 (Gradient: 0% Black, 25% Black, 50% Black, 75%
Black, 100% Black) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted after splitting the
file for condition and revealed a marginally significant race by gradient interaction
for the biological condition, F(4,48) = 2.27, p = .076, ηp2 = .159, a marginally
significant interaction for the social condition, F(4,64) = 2.14, p = .086, ηp2 = .118,
and a marginally significant interaction for the control condition, F(4,76) = 2.19, p
= .078, ηp2 = .104. When examining the biological condition, there was a main
effect of gradient on amplitude for White participants only, F(4,32) = 2.17, p =
.096, ηp2 = .213. However, pairwise comparisons between the gradients after
Bonferroni corrections revealed no significant differences, all ps > .494. There
was also a main effect of gradient on amplitude for White participants in the
social condition, F(4,40) = 3.22, p = .022, ηp2 = .244. However, pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed no significant differences
between gradients, all ps > .417. Finally, there was no main effect of gradient in
the control condition, all ps > .177.
LPP. Results indicated a significant main effect of gradient on LPP
amplitude at electrode cluster Pz, P3, and P4, F(4,188) = 2.49, p = .045, ηp2 =
.050. There was a gradient by race interaction on LPP amplitude, F(4,188) =
2.83, p = .026, ηp2 = .057, see Figure 11. There was a significant effect of
gradient on amplitude for White participants, F(4,140) = 3.21, p = .015, ηp2 = .084
but no significant main effect for Non-White participants F(4,64) = 1.66, p = .171,
ηp2 = .094. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences, all ps >
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.176 after Bonferroni corrections.
Perceiver Racial Categorization
In order to examine neural processing of faces as a function of
participants’ categorization of the targets, ERPs were time-locked to the target
presentation based on stimulus response. That is, different ERPs were created
for each categorization for each participant and averaged across participants
based on their response.
Neural Attention by Categorization. A 4 (Categorization: White, Black,
Mixed Race, Other Race) x 3 (Condition: Bio, Social, Control) x 2 (Race: White,
Non-White) ANOVA was conducted in order to test hypothesis five to see how
participants’ neural processing fluctuated based on their categorization of target
faces. There was a 3-way interaction between categorization, condition, and
participant race on neural processing of the N3 component, F(6,141) = 3.01, p =
.008, ηp2 = .114, see Figures 12a-12c. A 2 (Race: White, Non-White) x 4
(Response: White, Black, Mixed, Other) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted
after splitting the file for condition and revealed a significant interaction between
response and participant race for the control condition, F(3,76) = 3.80, p = .015,
ηp2 = .167, but no interaction for the biological condition, F(3,36) = .69, p = .56,
ηp2 = .055, or social condition, F(3,48) = .11, p = .955, ηp2 = .007. After breaking
down the control condition into race, there was no main effect of gradient on
amplitude after Bonferroni corrections, all ps > .365.
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to investigate how an essentialism
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manipulation influences implicit neural attention to multiracial and monoracial
faces. We sought to expand on previous research that suggests that an
essentialism manipulation impacts behavioral tasks (Ho et al., 2015; Williams &
Eberhardt, 2008) by extending the research to include neural attention. We were
similarly hoping to expand on studies involving the neural attention of racially
ambiguous individuals which only a handful of studies have done (Dickter &
Kittel, 2012; Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2006, 2008). Finally, we wanted to see how
categorization of racially ambiguous individuals influences the neural processing
of the participant, which has not yet been investigated.
For our manipulation check (hypothesis 1), we found a 3-way race by
condition by time interaction on essentialism scores. After breaking down this
effect, the only significant effect found was that non-White participants in the
social condition had higher post-test essentialism scores than pre-test
essentialism scores, which is the opposite of the predicted effect. For the most
part then, our findings did not suggest that the manipulation affected explicit
essentialism except in the social condition for non-White participants. Thus, in
the current study, reading the articles did not change participants’ essentialism
scores. This finding was counter to research by Williams and Eberhardt (2008)
and Ho, Roberts, and Gelman (2015) that successfully manipulated essentialism
using the current paradigm. One difference between their study and ours was
that theirs was conducted on U.S. adults on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and they
were specifically looking at the number of “Black” categorizations when given the
category options “Black”, “White”, or “Black/White Multiracial”. Because our study
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was conducted more recently on college students at a liberal arts college, the
manipulation may not have been strong enough to convince the students at the
college. In fact, a couple students claimed to not believe the article due to what
they had learned in a biology class. Although we excluded these participants in
our analyses, there may have been additional students included with similar
opinions who did not voice their concerns which may suggest why there was not
an increase in amplitudes in the biological condition. Similarly, because these
students were at a liberal arts college they may have already had more of a
social constructivist view of race leading to more of a ceiling effect and therefore
not changing their amplitudes much in the social condition. Although we
specifically recruited students with higher essentialism scores, most students
were mid-range in the essentialism scale. It could be that this manipulation may
work better on people who were higher on the essentialism scale and we did not
have the power in this study to look at this effect. Future research should
examine this possibility. Additionally, Ho and colleagues (2015) mentioned that
they morphed faces to be ambiguous but it was not clear whether they just
morphed 50% Black/White targets or did more of a gradient which would be more
similar to this study. Due to the lack of clarity, it is impossible to say for certain
what was done but it is possible that the researchers only used 50% faces which
people may more naturally categorize as “Black” given the alternatives.
We did not find support for hypothesis one, which served as manipulation
check and thus we were not successful in manipulating participants’ self-reported
essentialism. However, our results revealed that in the passive task, reaction
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times and several ERP components differed as a function of the essentialist
manipulation, the gradient of the target faces, and the racial category of the
participant. Thus, although not all of our hypotheses were supported by the data,
our results suggest that some of the implicit responses and neural processing of
faces of different levels of racial ambiguity was different based on participant
race and essentialism condition.
One of the most consistent findings in this study is the gradient by race
interactions in the passive task in all ERP components (P1, N170, P2, N2, P3,
N4, and LPP). The effects for the N170, P2, and N4 components were qualified
by 3-way interactions and thus will be discussed below. However, the P1, N2,
P3, and LPP components showed the race by gradient interactions regardless of
condition. In the P1 component, White participants allocated more neural
attention to Black target faces versus White target faces, suggesting more visual
and attentional processing toward Blacks (Luck, 2005; Wiese et al., 2009),
whereas non-White participants did not differ attention to target faces.
Additionally, although not significant, both White and non-White participants had
greatest attention to ambiguous faces in general as compared to monoracial
faces.
In the P3 and LPP components there was again an interaction and both
revealed effects for White participants but not for non-White participants. The P3
component could be further broken down and revealed greater attention to 25%
Black target faces rather than White faces. The P3 component is thought to
reflect novelty (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) so target faces that are not
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quite White but not very different from White may be novel to people being forced
to examine race of these target faces for the first time, whereas in a real-life
setting, people may not think about how a person looks only slightly different
from them but still different enough. This supports hypodescent (Ho, Sidanius,
Levin, & Banaji, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008) or the ingroup overexclusion
effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).
The results for the LPP component was different from previous studies
that revealed greater attention toward racial ingroup faces than outgroup faces
(Ito & Urland, 2003; Wiese et al., 2009) because although there were no further
effects, the pattern suggests that White participants had greater attention toward
outgroup faces than White faces. Because this is not significant, we will not
speculate further.
There was also an interaction between race and gradient in the N2
component but no effects when broken down further. This contradicts one of the
most consistent findings in ERP research with faces that the N2 component is
larger to racial ingroup than outgroup faces (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Ito
& Urland, 2003, 2005). The N2 component is sensitive to social group
membership so it is unclear why we did not find this effect. However, this passive
task is very different from most of the studies that have found this effect. Some of
the variations on procedures include a flanker task where multiple pictures are
shown at once (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007), categorization tasks (e.g., Ito &
Urland, 2003), context dependent or primed tasks (Ito & Urland, 2005; WilladsenJensen & Ito, 2015) or tasks such as the oddball task where more pictures of one
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racial category are shown with only a couple pictures from the other category (Ito
& Urland, 2005). It may be then that showing one picture at a time that equally
represent all categories shown but not requiring a response may lead to different
neural attention.
Among the most interesting effects was the 3-way interactions between
condition, race, and gradient in the N170, P2, and N4 components in the passive
task, suggesting that neural attention toward ambiguous and monoracial faces is
processed differently for White and Non-White participants and further depends
on whether participants were primed with either a biological view of race, a social
view of race, or a control condition not mentioning race. We found a 3-way
interaction in the N170 component and replicated previous studies which found
that White participants more deeply visually process own-race rather than otherrace faces (Caldara et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito & Urland, 2005;
Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008; Wiese et al., 2009). We extended on
this by finding that non-White participants processed Black faces more deeply
than any other gradient. It was also found that the greatest difference for gradient
between White and non-White participants occurred in the control condition. This
will be visited after discussing the 3-way interaction for component N4 which
found similar effects.
We also found a 3-way interaction in the P2 component. First, we
replicated previous work with White participants allocating greater neural
attention to Black/ambiguous faces than they did toward White faces (Dickter &
Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen
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& Ito, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, for non-White participants, there was an
interaction between race and gradient in both the biological and control
conditions. This suggests greater neural attention by White participants to nonWhite faces. Though these were not significant, White participants in the
biological condition had greater neural attention to every group than 0% Black
target faces than did non-White participants. In the control condition, White
participants allocated more attention toward all target groups than did non-White
participants, though this was not significant. In the social condition, White and
non-White participants allocated similar attention toward all ambiguous targets.
Interestingly, we found a 3-way interaction for the N4 component where
there were effects of race and gradient for all conditions. Upon breaking this
down further, there was an effect of gradient for White participants in the
biological and social condition. Traditionally, the N4 component has been used
as a measure of semantic processing to words or pictures (see Katas &
Federmeier, 2011, for a review), and amplitudes are usually larger in response to
greater incongruence. For instance, Kutas and Hillyard (1980) found that
participants had greater N4 amplitudes toward the sentence “He took a sip from
the transmitter” which was strongly incongruent with “He took a sip from the
water fountain” (pg. 203). Research has shown similar amplitude differences in
the N4 component based on how semantically incongruent sentences or words
and pictures are (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). We could not find any studies
linking the N4 component to perceivers looking at target faces, either race or
otherwise. In the current study, the incongruence may have something to do with
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this task. The N4 race by gradient interaction was significant only in the social
and biological conditions. Though there was no significance when broken down
further, the general pattern suggests larger amplitudes for ingroup faces for both
Whites and non-Whites. It may be that reading articles suggesting extremes of
race being either biological or socially constructed led viewers to process “ownrace” faces more deeply due to the incongruence about what they thought they
knew about their own race and what they had just been told. However, because
no other studies have found similar effects (even after semantic priming that
would theoretically lead to greater incongruence), this should be interpreted with
caution and further research should attempt to replicate this effect.
Interestingly, Non-White participants who are not primed with race
allocated greatest attention for 100% Black faces in both the N170 and N4
components. We found no research that included participants who were not one
of the target groups that were being tested (e.g., no research included Asian
participants when looking at Black and White multiracial faces). Our Non-White
participants showed greater amplitudes toward 100% Black target faces in the
N170 and N4 components which has typically been found to have highest
amplitude in own race faces (e.g., Caldara et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 2007; Ito
& Urland, 2005). This may be due to the fact that in the biological and social
condition participants were primed with race, but the article talked specifically
about identifying between Black and White individuals. In the control condition,
where the participants were not primed with race, Non-White participants may
have identified more with targets of color rather than White targets leading them
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to show similar effects to Black participants in other studies (Tajfel, 1979). This
identification may be due to the overexclusion effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992) or
the experiences/ethnic identification of minorities in the U.S. due to institutional
racism in the U.S. (e.g., Lopez, 2000). Therefore, priming race as White and
Black in the articles may have led non-Black, non-White participants to not
identify with either race and instead with their own race which was not
represented by target pictures. While these are interesting effects it is important
to note that after splitting participants into White and Non-White groups our
sample size per group was rather small. Additionally, grouping multiple different
races into a non-White category is not ideal as each racial category has their own
unique experiences and perceptions (e.g., Agiesta, 2015). However, previous
research suggests that some outgroups identify as minorities over their own
racial group when compared to Whites (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012) so we
thought it would be interesting to include.
There was a significant race by gradient interaction on participants’
reaction times as well. As expected, all participants were generally slower to
categorize ambiguous faces than they were monoracial faces. This is similar to
previous research that have found this effect (e.g., Levin, 2000; Peery &
Bodenhausen, 2008; Stroessner, 1996). However, White participants were faster
to categorize fully White targets than any other groups whereas non-White
participants were fastest to categorize fully White target faces than most other
groups but not faster than categorizing fully Black faces. These results were
surprising because although our hypothesis held, it would also make sense for
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White participants to be faster at categorizing 100% Black target faces than the
ambiguous race target faces. In most studies involving the categorization of
multiracial individuals, participants are generally given more time (e.g., Peery &
Bodenhausen, 2008). It may be that because in our study, participants did not
have much time to categorize, and because the faces were on a gradient
(meaning that the 0% and 25% Black faces would not differ much from each
other and the 25% and 50% Black faces would not differ much, and so on) White
participants erred on the side of caution based on the ingroup overexclusion
effect (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992) and therefore wanted to make sure they were
not accidentally adding outgroups to their ingroup, so they took longer to
categorize ambiguous faces.
The final interesting finding is that there was a 3-way interaction (race by
condition by response race) on hypothesis five that participants’ neural
processing would change based on their categorization of target faces. Further
breakdowns revealed only a race by response interaction for the control
condition. Although no responses were significantly different after breaking down
further, the patterns suggests that White participants did not differ much in neural
attention based on category chosen but that non-White participants had greater
neural attention to “Other Race” faces than other groups. We expected
participants to have greater neural attention toward faces they categorized as
“Other Race” than “Mixed Race” because they are different in terms of
essentialist views in terms of race being biological, immutable, and discrete.
Seeing an ambiguous race person and identifying them as “Mixed Race”
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suggests that the perceiver at least views race as not entirely discrete whereas
identifying the target as “Other Race” defies the notion of race in a spectrum and
suggests instead that it is discrete. Therefore, it is not surprising that non-White
participants showed greater attention toward “Other Race” faces. What is
surprising is that White participants did not show this effect and that this occurred
in the N3 component. The N3 component has often been linked to either
unexpected stimuli (Lai & Mangels, 2007) or incongruent pairings such as
incongruent word-picture pairs (Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Mazerolle et al., 2007;
Sitnikova et al., 2008). It may be that non-White participants who categorized
ambiguous faces as “Other Race” found the target picture as “unexpected” such
that perhaps they didn’t plan to use many “Other Race” labels but truly could not
consolidate the target faces as “Black”, “White”, or “Mixed Race” in their minds
therefore making the stimuli both “unexpected” and perhaps “incongruent” with
results. Similar to the findings for the N4 component, this component was
included because it was identified in the software as a clear component
according to the amplitude and it has not been shown in other face perception
research. Therefore, future researchers should try to replicate this effect.
As mentioned above, many factors including the small group sizes,
including all Non-White participants into the same category, and recruiting
college students whose means were mid to low range on the essentialism scale
could have affected these results. However, we did find effects including between
the target gradient race and participant race. Future studies should try to
replicate and extend our findings for multiracial target faces and should include
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Black participants as well as White. Also, while grouping non-White participants
into a single category was not ideal, some of our results suggest that the nonWhite participants in our sample show more similar results to Black participants
in other studies than to White participants in our study or other studies (Dickter &
Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Willadsen-Jensen
& Ito, 2006, 2008), especially those in the control condition. This may suggest
that certain racial groups identify more with Blacks than White and may consider
in-groups differently with a lack of option for their own race. For instance, racial
minorities in the U.S. may think on terms of “us” (i.e., racial minorities) versus
“them” (i.e., White) instead on traditional racial ingroups and outgroups.
The findings of this study suggest that the neural processing of racially
ambiguous individuals is affected potentially by essentialist beliefs but also
participant race. This is important because it suggests that the automatic
responses one has to a target may guide perceivers’ beliefs, feelings, and social
behavior toward multiracial individuals (Brewer, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). Because the multiracial population in the
U.S. is expanding (Gathier, 2015) it is important that we continue looking at
perception of multiracial individuals and continue to attempt to figure out ways to
reduce attentional bias toward multiracial individuals.
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Figures 1a-1c. Marginally significant three way interaction between race,
condition, and time on essentialism scores.
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Figure 2. Three way interaction between race, gradient, and condition on
participant reaction times during categorization task.
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Figure 3. Significant race by gradient interaction at component P1. After breaking
down race, there was a main effect of gradient for White participants.
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Figure 4a: Biological Condition
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Figures 4a-4c. Three-way interaction of race, gradient, and condition on N170
amplitude during the passive task.
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Figure 5. Three-way interaction of race, gradient, and condition on P2 amplitude
during the passive task.
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Figure 6. Race by gradient interaction on the amplitude of the N2 component.
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Figure 8. Gradient by race interaction for P3 amplitude with a significant main
effect of gradient for White participants.

73

8
7
6

P3 Amplitude

5
4
3
2
1
0
-1

Bio

Social

Control

-2
-3

Condition

Figure 9. Main effect of condition on P3 amplitude during the passive task.
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Figure 10a: Biological Condition
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Figures 10a-10c. Three way interaction between race, condition, and gradient for
N4 amplitude. Significant race by gradient interactions in all conditions. Main
effect for White participants in the social and biological conditions.
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Figure 11. Race by gradient interaction on LPP amplitude. Main effect of gradient
for White participants.
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Figure 12a: Biological Condition
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Figures 12a – 12c. Three way interaction between race, condition, and chosen
racial response for N3 amplitude during the categorization task. There was a
significant interaction between race and gradient for the control condition.
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Table 1
Participant Characteristics
Characteristic

Biological (n = 14)

Social (n = 18)

Control (n = 21)

Test Statistic

18.92 ± .30

19.17 ± .25

19.29 ± .23

F(2,52) = 0.47, p = .630

Gender (% female)

31%

50%

52%

χ2(1) = 1.67, p = .43

Race (% Caucasian)

64%

61%

76%

χ2(2) = 1.13, p = .57

RCS (Time 1)

4.32 ± .24

4.02 ± .18

4.13 ± .18

F(2,47) = 0.50, p = .610

ATB (Time 1)

6.15 ± .22

5.75 ± .17

5.91 ± .17

F(2,47) = 1.06, p = .354

6.9% ± 2.6%

8.4% ± 2.2%

8.2% ± 2.0%

F(2,52) = .12, p = .892

Age (years)

Familiarity Blacks (%)
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Appendix A
Target Faces Examples (Top = 0% Black to Bottom = 100% Black)
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Appendix B
Race Conceptions Scale
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

























































No one can change
his or her race - you
are who you are.















If a White American
family traveled
around the world,
people they met
would probably think
of them as White
too.

























































If a Black American
family traveled
around the world,
people they met
would probably think
of them as Black too.
The physical
features of different
racial groups haven't
really changed much
over the centuries.
The same racial
categories have
pretty much always
existed.
It's impossible to
determine how a
person will be
racially categorized
by examining their
DNA.

It's natural to notice
the racial group to
which people
belong.
I believe that
physical features
determine race.
Generally speaking,
two Black people will
always look more
similar to each other
than a Black person
and a White person
ever would.
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How a person is
defined racially
depends on the
social context.













































































































































It's easy to tell what
race people are by
looking at them.















Racial groups are
primarily determined
by biology.















Siblings born to the
same parents will
always be of the
same race as each
other.
Young children
probably learn about
which people fall into
which racial groups
automatically,
without much help
from adults.
A person's race is
fixed at birth.
The political climate
can dictate whether
someone is
categorized as Black
or White.
In 200 years, society
will use basically the
same racial
categories.
There's agreement
across cultures
about which racial
groups people fall
into.
The average person
is highly accurate at
identifying people by
race.
People who are of
different races may
look quite similar to
each other.
Racial categories
haven't always
existed in the world.
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It's possible to be a
full member of more
than one race.
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Appendix C
Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree











































Racial integration (of
schools, businesses,
residences, etc.) has
benefited both
Whites and Blacks.















I probably would feel
somewhat selfconscious dancing
with a Black in a
public place.







































































I enjoy a funny racial
joke, even if some
people might find it
offensive.
If I had a chance to
introduce Black
visitors to my friends
and neighbors, I
would be pleased to
do so.
I would rather not
have Blacks live in
the same apartment
building I live in.

I think that Black
people look more
similar to each other
than White people
do.
It would not bother
me if my new
roommate was
Black.
Inter-racial marriage
should be
discouraged to avoid
the "who-am-I?"
confusion which the
children feel.
If a Black were put in
charge of me, I
would not mind
taking advice and
direction from him or
her.
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Generally, Blacks
are not as smart as
Whites.















The federal
government should
take decisive steps
to override the
injustices Blacks
suffer at the hands
of local authorities.





























Black and White
people are inherently
equal.















I get very upset
when I hear a White
make a prejudicial
remark about
Blacks.





















































































It is likely that Blacks
will bring violence to
neighborhoods when
they move in.

I worry that in the
next few years I may
be denied my
application for a job
or a promotion
because of
preferential
treatment given to
minority group
members.
I favor open housing
laws that allow for
more racial
integration of
neighborhoods.
Black people are
demanding too much
too fast in their push
for equal rights.
I would not mind at
all if a Black family
with about the same
income and
education as me
moved in next door.
Whites should
support Blacks in
their struggle against
discrimination and
segregation.

84
Some Blacks are so
touchy about race
that it is difficult to
get along with them.
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Appendix D
Articles

Science News
BIOLOGY

Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Scientists working
on mapping the origins of life through the
Human Genome Project have uncovered some
genetic codes that they believe can be used as
indicators of racial background.
“Up till now, [we] weren’t able to determine
a person’s race based just on DNA,” said
Robert Kaminsky, a University of Virginia
scientist and lead author of the study, which
was just released in the prestigious journal
Gene. “But now we’re able to use some of the
genetic cues to skin color and other physical
features to guess at what a person may look
like, based on a very small genetic sample.”
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center
have been working for several years on
mapping the genotypic expressions involved in
skin color and other phenotypic physical
features. They have focused particularly on the
melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which is
implicated most powerfully in skin color. The
present study explores the link between this
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase
protein, which is involved in melanin production,
in varying amounts for different racial groups.
The researchers used skin, blood, and other
tissue samples from hospital patients whose
race was indicated in their charts, but was kept
hidden from lab members until the genetic
analyses were complete.
“We found that once we had a good idea of

where the genetic components to some of
these key physical features were located, we
were able to correctly guess the patients’ racial
backgrounds 69% of the time, which is well
above chance rate,” Dr. Kaminsky said. “And
with Black and White patients in particular, our
success rates were even higher.”
Their results add to the growing body of
evidence that so much of who we are as people
can be traced to our genetic origins – including
race.
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t
environmental influences on race, just like
everything else,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “But
in the end, we obtain our genetic material from
our parents, so we generally inherit their race
along with everything else.”
He pointed to evolutionary theories as to
why humans might have evolved to have
different physical appearances. For example,
the melanin that produces a dark skin color
among people of African heritage may have
served as a life-saving protection against strong
sun exposure, he said. And among people
living in what is now Northern Europe, their
relatively lesser access to sunlight was aided by
fairer skin, which allows for greater absorption
of Vitamin D.
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are
continuing their contribution to the Human
Genome Project with current work on the
genetic underpinnings of depression and other
mood disorders.

Link me to more news about:
Macromolecules
Biology

Immunology

Science News Subscription Information
http://www.sciencenews.com/cuttingedge/bio/17jan2017.html

Cell
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Science News
BIOLOGY
Scientists Reveal That Race Has No Genetic Basis
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Scientists working
on mapping the origins of life through the
Human Genome Project have definitively
demonstrated that no genetic codes can be tied
to racial background.
“Up till now, there was a big question [in the
scientific community] about whether we could
determine a person’s race based just on DNA,”
says Robert Kaminsky, a University of Virginia
scientist and lead author of the study, which
was just released in the prestigious journal
Gene. “But now we know the answer – there
are no genetic markers that indicate what racial
group a person belongs to.”
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center,
have been working for several years on
mapping the genotypic expressions involved in
skin color and other phenotypic physical
features. They have focused particularly on the
melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which is
implicated most powerfully in skin color. The
present study explores the link between this
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase
protein, which is involved in melanin production,
in varying amounts for different people.
The researchers used skin, blood, and other
tissue samples from hospital patients whose
race was indicated in their charts, but was kept
hidden from lab members until the genetic
analyses were complete.
“We found that even when we had a good
idea of where the genetic components to some
of these key physical features were located, we
were able to correctly guess the patients’ racial

backgrounds only 27% of the time, which is
really no better than chance rate,” Dr. Kaminsky
said. “There’s just no one cue or set of cues
that indicates, say, whether someone is Black
or White.”
Their results add to the growing body of
evidence that although genes do play an
important role in who we are, social and
environmental factors may in many
circumstances be even more powerful.
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t
hereditary components to physical
appearance,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “We do
inherit our physical appearance from our
parents, but the practice of classifying people
into different racial groups based on certain
patterns of physical appearance is entirely
cultural in origin. There’s just no genetic basis
for it.”
He pointed to evidence that each racial
group has more variability within the group in
any given physical dimension, such as skin
color, than exists between any two groups. He
also added that racial classification is a
relatively recent development in human history
– even though people’s physical appearances
have been relatively stable over time, the
categories into which people are classified
change constantly according to the political
climate.
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are
continuing their contribution to the Human
Genome Project with current work on the
genetic underpinnings of depression and other
mood disorders.
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Scientists Discover Galaxy with Gas Halo
CHARLOTTESVILLE – Astronomers
working to understand the many mysteries of
the universe have now discovered how galaxies
provide the fuel for star formation.
“Up till now, there was a big question [in
astronomy] about galaxies and how they found
the fuel to create billions of stars even after they
have already formed,” says Robert Kaminsky,
an astronomer at the University of Virginia and
lead author of the study, which was just
released in the prestigious journal Astronomy.
“But now we know the answer – the galaxy’s
immense gravity attracts gas, creating the
spherical halo and providing the fuel for star
formation.”
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa
Faridany, along with colleague Anthony Sanford
at Cambridge University, have been working for
several years studying distant galaxies and
their different features. They have focused
particularly on galaxy formation, uncovering the
different ways that galaxies may form and how
they interact with other objects and particles.
The present study now explores these recently
discovered gas clouds to investigate any other
links that they may provide to galaxy formation.
The researchers used NASA’s Chandra Xray Observatory to view the spherical gas halo
that was found centered on the nucleus of NGC
5746, a spiral galaxy like our own Milky Way.
The halo has a radius of about 60,000 light
years but is not visible in optical wavelengths.
“We are likely witnessing here the ongoing

galaxy formation process,” Dr. Kaminsky said.
“We did not detect this halo until recently
because NGC 5746 is a quiet galaxy compared
to our own Milky Way. It displays no unusual
star formation or energetic activity from its
central region. This led us to realize that the
gas is not being ejected out of the galaxy, but
being attracted into it.”
Their results add to the growing body of
evidence that galaxies can be shaped by the
activity of massive black holes in the centers,
causing gas particles to gravitate toward it.
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t other
ways that galaxies obtain their fuel for star
formation,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “We are
hoping to find alternative processes that also
explain galaxy formation. We’re also examining
the theory that galaxies can grow by
cannibalizing other galaxies.”
The finding of gas halos supports computer
simulations that show galaxies building up
gradually from the merger of small hot clouds of
intergalactic matter. According to this theory,
the gas halos covering the galaxies should be
detectable, but scientists were unsuccessful
detecting these halos until now with the help of
advancements in X-ray technology.
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are
continuing their exploration into galaxy
formation and hope to discover other gas halos
that support their findings.
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